Index of FBI 9/11 Documents on INTELWIRE, By Document Date

1995 to 2000

January through September 11, 2001

September 11, 2001

September 12, 2001

September 13-30, 2001

Oct. 1, 2001 to Dec. 31, 2001

Jan. 1, 2002 to April 30, 2002

May 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002


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9/11 Commission Memorandum on Relations with the Taliban

The 9/11 Commission interviewed Dr. Marvin Weinbaum, a former State Department analyst on Afghanistan and Pakistan, about the evolving understanding of the Taliban from their rise in the mid-1990s through September 11.

9/11 Commission Memorandum on Relations with the Taliban

Labels: 9-11-Commission, State-Department, Taliban

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1999 FBI Summary of Information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

This 18-page PDF, heavily redacted, contains three different versions of an FBI summary of information concerning September 11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed dated July 1999. Each version of the document is redacted differently. The document describes his membership during the 1980s in the Hizbul-Ittihad EI-Islami (Islamic Union Party), the Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf Group, and his employment by the government of Qatar during the early 1990s and alleged association with the Muslim Brotherhood.

7/8/1999: Summary of Information, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

Labels: Abdul-Hakim-Murad, Khalid-Shaikh-Mohammed, Ramzi-Yousef, Wali-Khan-Amin-Shah

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9/11 Commission Interview With Omar Al-Bayoumi

The 9/11 Commission interviewed Omar Al-Bayoumi, a Saudi who had contact with Nawaf Al Hazmi and Khalid Al Mihdhar in San Diego. Bayoumi was also acquainted with several people who helped the hijackers and with Anwar Awlaki.

9/11 Commission Memorandum for the Record, Omar Al-Bayoumi

Labels: 9-11-Commission, Anwar-Awlaki, Bayoumi, Fahad-Al-Thumairy, Hashim-Al-Attas, Isamu-Dyson, Khalid-Al-Mihdhar, Mohdar-Abdullah, Nawaf-Al-Hazmi, Osama-Basnan

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U.S. Air Force Contracts With Binladin Group For Communications Security

The U.S. Air Force paid more than $38 million in federal contracts to Baud Telecommunications, a subsidiary of the Saudi Binladin Group, since 2001. More than half of those contracts are dated after the attacks of September 11 -- and the contracts continued through 2007.

Air Force Contracts With Binladin Group, 2001-2007

The majority of the contracts deal with security issues. About $21 million of the contracts were to provide communications security equipment and components for the Air Force's Electronic Systems Center. Another contract provided $17 million to the same office for modifications of communication equipment, including about $500,000 for cryptology equipment.

The Army had two contracts with Baud prior to September 11, worth a bit more than $2 million, but no contracts after the attack. Prior to 2000, the Army, Air Force and Navy had contracts with Binladen Telecommunications, which changed its name to Baud in 1999 after Osama bin Laden's role in global terrorism became widely known.

Labels: Air-Force, Binladin-Group, INTELFILES, Osama-Bin-Laden

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1994 State Department Cable Referencing Al Qaeda

Earlier this year, I posted some material about the date of Al Qaeda's founding, and a corollary issue, the earliest date of a U.S. government document that mentions the name of Al Qaeda.

The document question stems from an assertion by the House and Senate Select Intelligence Committees Joint Inquiry Into September 11 that the earliest reference they could find mentioning Al Qaeda by name was late 1996 (see Report Of The Joint Inquiry, page 745).

Although the original document has not been released to the public, we know from a reference in a later document that the FBI was told the name Al Qaeda in 1993 by Ali Mohamed, a former U.S. Special Forces sergeant who had infiltrated the U.S. on behalf of Al Qaeda.

Here's a another interesting example, a State Department cable dated Feb. 2, 1994, detailing a published interview with Talaat Fouad Qasem (aka Talaat Fouad Qassem, Abu Talal Al-Qasem and Abu Talal al-Qasimy), an extremely important leader of the Islamic Group. This document is full of interesting (and possibly fanciful) claims, but here's one of the highlights:

Some of the group of Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahry went to Saudi Arabia, and he went to Peshawar. In the beginning, they were called 'The Accused In The Jihad Organization Case.' When they got acquainted with Osama Ben Laden, a wealthy Saudi who believes in the principle of Jihad, he trusted them, and they jointly started to establish the 'Base,' a guest house for those desiring to participate in the Afghan Jihad. Ever since, they named themselves The Jihad Group ("Gama'at Al-Jihad").

"The Base" is, of course, the English translation of "Al Qaeda." Given that the "Base" is referenced in quote marks in two different places in this cable, it's safe to assume the translator realized it was supposed to be a name -- but neglected to provide the original Arabic as he or she did for "The Jihad Group" just one sentence later.

At any rate, this is an interesting document both for its early reference to Al Qaeda (firmly situating it with the known terrorist group Al Jihad) and for its confirmation of other documents placing the founding of Al Qaeda as roughly concurrent to the waning years of the Afghan Jihad.

Perhaps more significantly, it also corroborates other intelligence that specifies the importance of Ayman Al-Zawahiri to Al Qaeda from day one. Qasem here indicates Zawahiri is an equal co-founder of Al Qaeda. Although many sources refer to a 1998 "official" announcement as the date of the merger between Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Al Qaeda, it's quite clear from a wide variety of sources that the two organizations were joined at the hip from Al Qaeda's earliest days.

Feb. 2, 1994 State Department cable, "ISLAMIC GROUP" SPOKESMAN OUTLINES TERRORIST STRATEGY AND ALLEGES USG "ASSURANCES" TO THE IG

Labels: Ayman-Al-Zawahiri, Egyptian-Islamic-Jihad, INTELFILES, Islamic-Group, Osama-Bin-Laden, Talaat-Fouad-Qassem

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9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record, 11/20/2003, State Department Interviews

9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record, 11/20/2003, State Department Interviews

9/11 Commission interview with Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State, and Jamie Borek, Assistant Legal Counsel, Department of State. Discussion of improvements, and areas in need of improvement, related to the State Department's handling of intelligence in the wake of September 11.

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, INTELFILES, State-Department

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9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record, 9/12/2003, CIA Budget

Memorandum for the Record, 9/11 Commission, 9/12/2003: CIA Interviews

This is a tough examination of the effect of politically mandated budget cuts on the CIA prior to September 11. Subjects interviewed were Pat Hanback of the CIA's Inspector General Office and another subject whose name has been redacted.

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, Budget, CIA, Counterterrorism, INTELFILES

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9/11 Commission Memoranda on Extremism in Pakistan

In light of recent developments in Pakistan, it's useful and interesting to take a look at some of the interviews conducted in Pakistan by the 9/11 Commission, which spoke with State Department hands, Pakistani officials at various levels and local journalists.

What immediately grabs you about these accounts is the breathtaking state of denial among Pakistani officials. One wonders what they think now.

10/25/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Retired Lt. Gen. Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah, Governor of the Northwest Frontier Province

"[T]he Governor strongly disputed the coalition perception of the situation. He flatly stated that terrorist groups could not have a base in the NWFP; it was 'impossible.' Madrassas were in cities, not the countryside. Weapons would have to be used for training, making noise that would give them away. That would be reported. Most of the population was not with the jihadis. These people were probably being harbored in Afghanistan."

10/26/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with U.S. State Department Country Team, Islamabad

"Asked what the current government wants to accomplish, beyond the defense and foreign policy sphere, emphasis was placed on economic stability, controlling corruption, sustaining some kind of democratic transition, and developing moderate Islam."

10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Ashraf Naser, Chief Secretary of Balochistan

"We told him that we had concerns about Balochistan, that many informed officials in both Afghanistan and Pakistan had told us that it is unsafe, insecure and that extremists are gaining the upper hand there. Naser disagreed vehemently with this characterization. 'Why don't you come to Quetta with me? He invited. Foreign journalists roam freely
there. I don't see a problem.' [...]

"Naser said that the U.S. had more or less brought the 9/11 attacks on itself. You left Afghanistan unattended, we told you that was a mistake. We knew what was happening
there. But the Pakistanis could not control the Taliban in Afghanistan.

"He asserted that the recent sectarian killings in Balochistan were part of an Afghan plot to destabilize the region. The suicide bombers were part of Taliban groups trained in Afghanistan, he said. These suicide bombers were Baloch from south of Quetta, they were trained by Indians in Afghanistan. 'The Northern Alliance is openly contemptuous of us.'"

10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Secretary Tasneem Noorani, Pakistani Ministry of Interior

"He indicated that he and the entire Ministry were in shock by the 9-11 attacks and were struck by the scale and scope of the attacks. They couldn't image that the attacks could be connected with Pakistan. The initial reaction was a total blank. They didn't know how to react.

"Only after the US began discussing Usama bin Laden did the Ministry become aware of UBL and that the region, Pakistan and Afghanistan, was somehow involved. UBL was not known in Pakistan. He is an eccentric Saudi and was not understood by most people. [...]

"The Secretary seemed completely surprised by evidence that KSM had been active in Karachi and that he celebrated the 9-11 attacks in there and was actually interviewed by a journalist in Karachi about the attack. This information was a surprise to the Secretary. He asked for proof. He didn't believe any accounts of journalists in this regard."

The U.S. consul in Karachi didn't fare much better before the Commission's questioning.

10/20/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Douglas C. Rohn, Consul General, U.S. Consulate, Karachi

"The Consul did not have a very informed understanding of the type and sophistication of the threat in Karachi or the region. He had no estimate of the al Qai' da presence, though he recognized that they have long operated in the region. His insights into the terrorist threat, from his few months on the job, were very basic and didn't provide any new information ... 'we've been attacked here in Karachi, the bad guys are out there, I'm trying to keep American safe.'"

It wasn't all bad, however. There were a few people who seemed to know what they were talking about.

10/25/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Arlene Ferrill, Consul General, U.S. Consulate, Peshawar

"CG Ferrill commented on the NWFP government that arose out of the parliamentary elections in the fall of 2002. Eveyone had been surprised, including the victors, by the success of the six-party Islamic coalition, led by the JI (Qazi Hussain Ahmed) and JUI(Fezlur Rahman), Their rhetorical agenda calls for restoration of Sharia law and stresses anti-American themes. [Comment: An Islamic coalition also won power at the same time in Balochistan.] The popular climate in the NWFP is anti-American. In that sense, not much has changed in Peshawar since 9111. Though openly wearing guns has stopped in Peshawar, it continues in the tribal areas - as does the availability of a wide variety of arms in nearby bazaars."

10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with journalist Ahmed Rashid

"[Prior to 9/11], the US had a policy on terrorism, focused only on what they wanted with Bin Laden. But the Americans did not present Pakistan, then under sanctions, either with carrots or with sticks. Clinton had snubbed Pakistan with the way he had handled his visit, favoring India, in March 2000. To present carrots and/or sticks would have required a real geopolitical strategy toward Pakistan, not just toward terrorism."

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, INTELFILES, MFR, Pakistan, State-Department

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9/11 Commission, FBI Source Documents, Chronological, Jan. 1, 2004 to End of FOIA Response

A note to readers: This is the last batch of chronological documents provided by the FBI to the 9/11 Commission and referenced in footnotes to that report.

There are a handful of major reports left to post, representing some of the FBI's deepest analytical works regarding the September 11 attacks. Those reports will be posted over the next several weeks.

A substantial amount of additional 9/11 materials are available and will continue to be posted here, as well as a variety of declassified government documents on various topics of intererst, including crime and law enforcement, national security, intelligence, war on terror, and more.

01/04/2004: FBI Summary of Information, Lotfi Raissi

01/04/2004: FBI Summary of Information, Lotfi Raissi

Raissi was an Algerian national who lived in Phoenix and attended flight school shortly after Hani Hanjour, one of the 9/11 hijackers. This 22-page document contains a substantial amount of information the FBI collected on Raissi, including alleged links to Hanjour and previous investigations in several countries. The document also contains information about Hanjour's flight training and additional unknown individuals who took flight training at the same time.

02/09/2004: FBI/DS Deployment to Sierra Leone

02/09/2004: FBI/DS Deployment to Sierra Leone

02/09/2004: FBI/DS Deployment to Sierra Leone

Details of an FBI investigative trip to Sierra Leone. The reasons for the trip are related to the investigation of conflict diamonds to finance al Qaeda.

03/25/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Louise Sweeney (9/11 Families)

04/07/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Fuad Omar Bazarah

04/07/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Fuad Omar Bazarah

05/17/2004: FBI Summary of Information, Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah

05/18/2004: FBI Summary of Information, Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah

05/18/2004: FBI Summary, Interview of Charles Sabah Toma (re: Modhar Mohamed Abdullah)

06/09/2004: FBI, Information in Preparation for Interview of Yazeed Saad Atif
Al-Salmi

06/17/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Yazeed Al Salmi

06/17/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Yazeed Al Salmi

06/17/2004: FBI FD-302, Interrogation of Yazeed Al Salmi

07/01/2004: FBI Lead Sheet, Mohdar Mohamed Abdullah

The four documents that follow appear to be the same document with wildly different patterns of redaction applied by the FBI.

04/25/2006: FBI Memorandum, Connections of San Diego PENTTBOMB Subjects to the Government of Saudi Arabia

04/25/2006: FBI Memorandum, Connections of San Diego PENTTBOMB Subjects to the Government of Saudi Arabia

Date Unclear: FBI Memorandum, Connections of San Diego PENTTBOMB Subjects to the Government of Saudi Arabia

Date Unclear: FBI Memorandum, Connections of San Diego PENTTBOMB Subjects to the Government of Saudi Arabia

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, FBI, Flight-Schools, Hijackers, INTELFILES, Lotfi-Raissi, Saudi-Arabia

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A note to readers: This is the last batch of chronological documents provided by the FBI to the 9/11 Commission and referenced in footnotes to that report. There are a handful of major reports left to post, representing some of the FBI's deepest analytical works regarding the September 11 attacks. Those reports will be posted over the next several weeks.

Labels: INTELFILES

Views expressed on INTELWIRE are those of the author alone.

Posted by J.M. Berger | Permalink

 

10/2/2001: Secret Post-9/11 Briefing To World Leaders

Shortly after 9/11, U.S. embassies around the world were instructed to deliver a top-secret briefing to world leaders on the attacks of September 11. The report was a snapshot of everything the U.S. knew about al Qaeda at the time, including highly sensitive and classified intelligence helping prove the case that Al Qaeda had carried out the attack. The briefing also implicated Al Qaeda for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 thwarted Bojinka plot. Embassies were instructed on Oct. 2, 2001, to deliver "oral briefings only and not [repeat] not leave the document" in hard copy form.

According to the briefing:

"In the run-up to September 11, Bin Ladin and his associates seemed to be anticipating what we could only identify as an important event or activity, possibly an attack, although location and target were not clear."

An Al Qaeda informant "positively identified several of the September 11 hijackers as known Bin Ladin associates from photo spreads and possibly recognized other additional hijackers as well."

"All source intelligence reporting indicates that Bin Ladin and senior lieutenants had advance knowledge of the operational planning and timing for the attacks. Specific warnings went out to selected Bin Ladin confidents in Afghanistan and elsewhere to move to safe havens in anticipation of an immediate U.S. response following the attacks."

The document lists several key figures involved in the 9/11 attack, but notably fails to identify the plot's mastermind and operational commander, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed -- despite several references to the 1995 Bojinka plot, in which Mohammed conspired with his nephew Ramzi Yousef to execute a massive attack using civilian airliners.

Click here to read the briefing document

Labels: 9-11, INTELFILES, State-Department

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State Department Documents Cited in 9/11 Commission Report, Part 1 of 2

The following documents are State Department cables which were referenced in the footnotes of the 9/11 Commission Report. A second batch will be posted within the next few weeks.

5/21/1996: Communique from Sudan re: Osama bin Laden

Notification to U.S. government that Bin Laden and "Egyptian terrorist elements" have left the Sudan.

8/6/1996: Major Usama Bin Laden Asset Deregistered

Bin Laden's Taba Investments (Tabba For Investment) deregistered by Sudanese government. Four Bin Laden firms are also discussed -- Wadi-Alageeg Construction Company, Tabba For Investment, El-Thimar Al-Mobark Agricultural Company, and the Khartoum Tannery.

9/14/1998: Secret meeting with Taliban Official Abdul Hakim Mujahid

Taliban warned that harboring Osama bin Laden has put "the Taliban and the U.S. on a collision course." Taliban reported that they had "warned
him once again not to engage in political or press activities."

10/12/1998: Secret meeting with Taliban official Maulawi Wakil Ahmed

Suggests "the Taliban are wrestling with the Bin Ladin issue and that their heretofore hard-line stance on this issue may be in some, sort of flux."

2/16/1999: Secret Memo, The Saudi Binladin Group, Builders to the King

Claims company "has sought to make clear that it has no links with the Islamist fanatic (and half brother) Usama by publicly and unequivocally condemning his actions and taking the necessary legal steps to ensure that all connections have been severed."

10/8/1998: Designation of Al Qaeda as a terrorist organization

12/14/1999: Secret Memo, Saudis on US Warning to Taliban re: UBL

The Saudis agree that Bin Laden is a threat to the Kingdom.

Labels: INTELFILES, Osama-Bin-Laden, State-Department, Taliban

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9/11 Commission, FBI Source Documents, Chronological, Jan. 1, 2003 to Dec. 31, 2003

1/8/2003: FBI Letterhead Memorandum, Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas

1/8/2003: FBI Letterhead Memorandum, Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas (unredacted)

1/16/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of interrogation, Derar Mohammed Saleh

2/4/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of interrogation, Shareef Abdulmuttaleb El-Arbi

2/4/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of interrogation, Shareef Abdulmuttaleb El-Arbi (less redacted)

2/4/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of interrogation, Shareef Abdulmuttaleb El-Arbi (different redactions)

2/2003: FBI Secret Report, "The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model"

3/19/2003: FBI Information Control Document, ADENBOM

3/19/2003: FBI Information Control Document, ADENBOM (second version)

3/19/2003: FBI Information Control Document, Redacted, Refs Hamas, Al Qaeda

4/2/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of interrogation, Abdulaziz Al-Roomi

4/2/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of interrogation, Abdulaziz Al-Roomi (second version)

4/2/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of interrogation, Abdulaziz Al-Roomi (third version)

7/18/2003: FBI Letterhead Memorandum, Al Qaeda and Conflict Diamonds

7/18/2003: FBI Letterhead Memorandum, Al Qaeda and Conflict Diamonds (version 2)

8/18/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of Interrogation, Interview of Omar Al Bayoumi

9/17/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of Interrogation, Interview of Omar Al Bayoumi

9/17/2003: FBI FD-302, Record of Interrogation, Interview of Omar Al Bayoumi (version 2)

9/22/2003: FBI Information Control Document, Rayed Mohammed Abdullah

10/16/2003: FBI Information Control Document, Hamdan Ghareeb Al-Shalawi

11/14/2003: FBI Chronology of Hijackers' Activities

11/17/2003: FBI Summary of Abdelghani Mzoudi Proceedings

12/4/2003: FBI Transcript of Flight 93 Cockpit Recorder

12/5/2003: FBI Summary of Abdelghani Mzoudi Proceedings

12/5/2003: FBI Summary of Abdelghani Mzoudi Proceedings (2)

12/5/2003: FBI Summary of Abdelghani Mzoudi Proceedings (3)

Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, FBI, Hijackers, INTELFILES

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State Department Analysis: Exporting Terrorist Tactics From Iraq

EXCLUSIVE TO INTELWIRE: This newly declassified 2005 State Department analysis highlights one of the most signficant concerns about blowback from the invasion of Iraq -- its use as a proving ground for terrorist tactics and terrorist operatives.

The analysis warns that "the terrorist tactics that have been tested and
refined in [Iraq] may soon become globalized."

Although much of the report has been redacted prior to release by the State Department (an appeal is underway), several specific threat areas are identified:

Improvements to the design of vehicular improvised explosive devices (car bombs)

Proliferation of other types of IEDs -- the report states "Anything can be a bomb."

Improvements and establishment of networks for forged identities and diguise

Advances in the use of technology by terrorists

3/17/2005: State Department Cable, Exporting Terrorist Tactics From Iraq

Labels: INTELFILES, Iraq

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